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Are Target Date Funds the Easy Bake Option? 
 
 
Target date funds provide a simple, automated approach to retirement savings in defined 
contribution plans. The passing of the “Pension Protection Act of 2006” has seen an increase in the 
popularity of these funds in the U.S., becoming the default option for many plans. However, recent 
research findings have challenged the easy bake or ‘set-and-forget’ nature of target date funds. This 
study explores some of the critical design features of target date funds (which shifts an individual’s 
asset allocation from growth to defensive assets following a pre-set glidepath) against a simple 
balanced (or target risk) fund design. Using both time-weighted and dollar-weighted returns, our 
results suggest that there is more to achieving successful retirement outcomes than the investor 
simply selecting a proposed year of retirement. Our findings can perhaps be summarised by 
Einstein’s famous epithet, that in the murky world of retirement product design, “everything should 
be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.” 
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Are Target Date Funds the Easy Bake Option? 
Introduction 
One of the most interesting findings in the financial literacy debate is the idea that 
heightened financial education of consumers may not result in good financial decisions in practice 
(Willis, 2008; West, 2012). Target date funds (TDFs) provide a simple, automated approach to 
retirement savings not only for investors with varying levels of financial education and literacy but 
also for those who are subject to status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). The ‘set-and-
forget’ nature of the product seems, prima facie, well suited to assist with improving the retirement 
outcomes of investors - in short- an ‘easy bake’ option. 
This study explores a critical design feature of TDFs which shifts an individual’s portfolio 
allocation from growth to defensive assets following a pre-set glidepath. Since the introduction of 
the “Pension Protection Act (2006)”, total assets of U.S. pension funds have grown rapidly, currently 
standing at around US$17 trillion.1 TDFs have become increasingly popular among pension fund 
providers in the U.S. and other nations as a default choice for their members’ retirement plan 
investments with a forecast of these representing nearly 23% of all U.S. fund investments by 2016 
(Steyer, 2012). 
However, despite their simplicity and convenience, a pertinent question to ask is whether 
TDFs result in superior retirement outcomes for members compared to other equally simple and 
convenient alternatives like a balanced or target risk fund (TRF). Do they reduce the risk of 
retirement investing? Using both time- and dollar-weighted returns, we argue that there is more to 
achieving successful retirement outcomes than the investor simply selecting a target date of 
retirement. 
                                                            
1 Towers Watson survey as of December 31, 2012. See: 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20130131/REG/130139981/towers-watson-global-retirement-assets-hit-record-30-
trillion?newsletter=defined-contribution&issue=20130204&utm_source=dc_digest&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_digest  
3Exploring the Design of TDFs 
One of the key considerations in lifecycle investing is the changing allocation to growth 
assets over time (see Bodie, Merton and Samuelson, 1992). Typically, a lifecycle fund or TDF has a 
downward trend in the allocation to growth assets over time, reducing the portfolio’s exposure to 
volatility as the plan member ages (Jagannathan and Kocherlakota, 1996; Frank and Blanchett, 2009; 
2010; Friday, Tiefenbach and Goff, 2010). By way of basic illustration, Exhibit 1 below graphically 
illustrates a linear downward sloping TDF.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this study we consider the terminal wealth outcomes of TDF and TRF strategies. We 
explore the outcomes from a hypothetical 25 year old plan participant commencing their working 
life as of January 1, 2012 with a starting salary of $30,000; contributing 9 per cent per annum. 
Contributions are made at the end of each year until the participant reaches the retirement age of 
65 years. Hence the first contribution does not occur until age 26 and consequently the portfolio 
experiences 40 years of contributions and investment returns. The salary growth rate follows the 
                                                            
2 We note that there are a myriad of other approaches to TDF design (see, Scheuenstuhl, Blome, Mader, Karim 
and Friendrich, 2010). 
Exhibit 1
Example TDF with a linear downward sloping asset allocation from age 45 to 65 years 
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‘humped’ wage profile of Byrne, Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2006), where the highest salary growth 
rates are experienced in the mid-career stage (see Appendix One).  
 
Variable Value
Starting balance $0
Starting salary $30,000
Salary growth rate Appendix One
Contribution rate 9% p.a.3
Starting age 25 years
Retirement age 65 years
Investment horizon* 41 Years
* First Contribution made at the end of 
year one with 40 years of returns. 
 
The asset class data used in this study comes from the Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002) 
database. We use annual real return data for U.S. stocks, bonds and bills from 1900-2011 (n=112). 
Each 40-year rolling period is analysed in the study (e.g. the first period covers 1900-1939; second 
1901-1940 and so on). A summary of the assumptions for our hypothetical plan member are 
provided in Exhibit 2. We use these input values and apply the various historical return paths (a form 
of historical simulation) to analyse the terminal wealth outcomes (i.e. we take the assumed 
contribution profile and assume the various 40-year paths to repeat in the future).4 
This study considers three asset allocation strategies: a TRF and two TDFs as shown below.5 
The three asset allocation strategies invest in growth (stocks) and defensive (bonds and cash with a 
3:1 split) assets.  
1. TRF (70/30) = Target Risk Fund with 70% stocks, 22.5% bonds and 7.5% cash 
                                                            
3 Munnel and Sunden (2006) found that U.S. members commonly contribute around 9 per cent per annum to 
their portfolio, see Drew and Stanford (2001) and Basu and Drew (2010) for the Australian experience. 
4 For Monte Carlo and bootstrap approaches to the problem, see Basu and Drew (2009) and Basu, Bryne, and 
Drew (2011). 
5 A TRF’s asset allocation strategy differs from a TDF as it is optimized on time-weighted risk to returns whilst 
TDFs attempt to optimize dollar-weighted returns by employing only the target date into the model. 
Exhibit 2 
Summary of plan member assumptions 
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2. TDF70 (30-10) = Target Date Fund with 70% stocks, 22.5% bonds and 7.5% cash until year 
30. The allocation to stocks linearly decreases to 0% over the final 10 years with 3:1 split 
between bonds and bills throughout. 
3. TDF70 (20-20) = Target Date Fund with 70% stocks, 22.5% bonds and 7.5% cash until year 
20. The allocation to stocks linear decreases to 0% over the final 20 years with 3:1 split 
between bonds and bills 
Results 
Exhibit 3 illustrates every 40-year rolling path from 1900 to 2011 for the three strategies 
considered in this paper. The historical accumulation paths permit a comparison of results between 
the TRF and the two TDFs. As expected, the standard deviation of terminal wealth declines as we 
move into a more defensive portfolio (with the means, minimums and maximums all reducing as we 
move from left to right). To further explore of the outcomes from different asset allocation rules, we 
consider the differences between time-weighted and dollar-weighted returns using the framework 
of Dichev (2007) and Dichev and Yu (2011). 
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Summary Statistics of Terminal Wealth outcomes 
Mean $545,574 
Standard Deviation $147,441
Maximum $926,552
Minimum $281,909
Summary Statistics of Terminal Wealth outcomes 
Mean $659,759 
Standard Deviation $172,843 
Maximum $1,048,997 
Minimum $364,195 
Summary Statistics of Terminal Wealth outcomes
Mean $469,212
Standard Deviation $132,255 
Maximum $825,328 
Minimum $269,783
n=73 rolling 40-year accumulation paths from 1900-2011
Using rolling historical 40-year return paths, the assumptions outlined in Exhibit 2 were used to create the 73 wealth 
accumulation paths in the Figures. The summary statistics of terminal wealth outcomes are also provided in the Table on 
the Figures, these represent the statistics for the distribution of values at age 65. 
TRF(70/30) TDF70(30-10) TDF70(20-20) 
Exhibit 3 
Rolling 40-year paths for each asset allocation with summary statistics 
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 Dichev (2007) and Dichev and Yu (2011) argue that simply taking a geometric return 
approach to determining an annual return is potentially biased as it does not provide a weighting to 
the timing of capital flows. The IRR approach allows for the timing of capital flows to be incorporated 
into the analysis as it assigns a return which gives a zero net present value to all capital flows. Hence, 
Dichev (2007) and Dichev and Yu (2011) posit that IRR is a superior methodology to evaluate 
performance as it allows for the changes in capital to be a factor in the overall return. Following 
Dichev (2007), the respective equations for the geometric return and the IRR used in this study are 
as follows. 
 ࡳࢋ࢕࢓ࢋ࢚࢘࢏ࢉ ࡾࢋ࢚࢛࢘࢔ ൌ  ൤ሺ૚ ൅ ࢘૚ሻ כ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢘૛ሻכ … כ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢚࢘ሻ ൨
૚/࢚
െ ૚    [1] 
  where   rt = return for period t 
    t = number of periods 
ࡵ࢔࢚ࢋ࢘࢔ࢇ࢒ ࢘ࢇ࢚ࢋ ࢕ࢌ ࡾࢋ࢚࢛࢘࢔ ൌ ࡯ࡲ૚ כ ሺ૚ ൅ ࡵࡾࡾሻି૚ ൅ ࡯ࡲ૛ כ ሺ૚ ൅ ࡵࡾࡾሻି૛ ൅ ڮ ൅  ࡯ࡲ࢚ כ
                                                      ሺ૚ ൅ ࡵࡾࡾሻି࢚ ൌ ૙       [2] 
  where  CFt = cash flow at time t 
    IRR = internal rate of return which discounts the cash flows to 0 
Adapting the work of Dichev (2007) and Dichev and Yu (2011), we analyse all 40-year paths 
from 1900-2011 to examine the number of paths which experienced a dollar-weighted return 
greater than the time-weighted return. Exhibit 4 provides both IRR and geometric returns of the TRF 
and the two TDFs for every 40-year rolling paths in our sample period. With respect to the colour 
coding of this table, the geometric return column is displayed in three different formats- white, grey 
and a single underlined value in the geometric return column for each strategy. The grey (white) 
represents the geometric returns which are below (above) the median which is underlined. This 
colour coding is used to illustrate how geometric returns are distributed when ranked against 
terminal wealth. The IRR column also has grey and white colour coding. Here, the grey (white) 
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represents an IRR that is below (above) the path’s respective geometric return and hence a bad 
(good) order of returns has been involved (see Dichev, 2007; Johnston, Hatem and Carnes, 2010; 
Dichev and Yu, 2011).   
9TRF(70/30)  TDF70 (30-10)  TDF70 (20-20) 
Year Geometric IRR 
Terminal 
Wealth 
 
Year Geometric IRR 
Terminal 
Wealth 
 
Year Geometric IRR 
Terminal 
Wealth 
1981 4.55% 3.00% $364,195  1981 3.84% 1.61% $281,909  1981 3.69% 1.36% $269,783 
1974 4.31% 3.06% $368,601  1980 3.41% 1.79% $290,981  1980 3.25% 1.56% $279,067 
1978 3.99% 3.41% $395,166  1979 3.57% 2.55% $334,314  1951 2.54% 2.08% $306,441 
1979 4.01% 3.43% $396,597  1983 4.08% 2.58% $336,437  1952 2.62% 2.23% $315,143 
1982 4.93% 3.59% $409,068  1982 4.49% 2.83% $352,910  1979 3.37% 2.26% $316,668 
1980 4.38% 3.70% $418,126  1947 3.65% 2.91% $358,380  1983 4.00% 2.42% $326,233 
1977 4.62% 3.75% $422,788  1951 3.04% 2.91% $358,522 1950 2.72% 2.49% $330,591
1975 4.15% 3.77% $424,494  1948 2.99% 2.97% $362,520 1953 3.05% 2.52% $332,566
1984 4.58% 3.78% $425,304  1984 4.10% 3.01% $364,955  1948 2.80% 2.57% $336,063 
1983 4.84% 3.92% $437,151  1950 3.11% 3.14% $374,832 1982 4.34% 2.60% $337,729
1948 3.67% 4.17% $460,707  1952 3.22% 3.23% $380,880 1947 3.56% 2.68% $342,877
1942 3.86% 4.24% $466,609  1949 3.04% 3.34% $389,411 1956 3.16% 2.79% $349,764
1941 3.80% 4.29% $472,352  1978 3.98% 3.34% $389,731 1984 4.00% 2.81% $351,101
1976 4.03% 4.33% $475,859  1946 3.23% 3.49% $401,240 1949 2.75% 2.82% $352,105
1947 4.48% 4.40% $482,988  1953 3.72% 3.62% $411,812 1959 4.50% 2.82% $352,114
1985 4.57% 4.64% $507,773  1985 4.13% 3.94% $439,640  1958 4.37% 2.84% $353,150 
1987 5.60% 4.73% $517,308  1944 3.72% 3.98% $442,880 1954 3.45% 2.90% $357,452
1949 3.87% 4.78% $522,612  1977 4.77% 4.00% $444,183 1978 3.69% 2.92% $358,621
1990 5.34% 4.78% $522,670  1943 4.08% 4.03% $447,312 1955 3.01% 2.97% $362,280
1943 4.50% 4.78% $523,292  1954 4.19% 4.07% $450,914 1957 4.22% 3.07% $369,702
1973 5.22% 4.84% $529,583  1942 3.77% 4.10% $453,560 1946 3.14% 3.27% $384,226
1946 4.01% 4.89% $535,313  1956 4.03% 4.18% $461,274 1960 5.39% 3.38% $392,454
1988 5.87% 4.91% $537,413  1975 4.40% 4.20% $463,657 1977 4.36% 3.41% $394,761
1986 5.50% 5.12% $562,292  1955 3.81% 4.24% $467,102  1961 5.07% 3.42% $395,817 
1944 4.37% 5.15% $566,439  1945 3.58% 4.27% $470,036  1975 3.87% 3.42% $395,952 
1994 4.92% 5.21% $573,584  1987 5.37% 4.37% $479,973  1969 3.63% 3.49% $401,230 
1950 4.30% 5.22% $574,549  1976 4.08% 4.39% $481,941  1974 4.40% 3.49% $401,332 
1940 4.52% 5.25% $578,120  1988 5.58% 4.43% $486,159  1985 3.94% 3.62% $412,096 
1951 4.43% 5.36% $592,607  1974 5.04% 4.44% $486,979  1968 3.35% 3.71% $418,911 
1953 4.77% 5.40% $598,337  1958 5.42% 4.44% $487,415  1962 4.82% 3.73% $420,871 
1989 5.91% 5.43% $601,960  1941 3.88% 4.49% $491,923  1967 3.88% 3.74% $421,452 
1992 5.65% 5.51% $612,992  1959 5.65% 4.58% $501,828  1976 3.63% 3.75% $422,796 
1991 5.74% 5.54% $616,223  1957 5.22% 4.60% $503,867  1963 5.03% 3.80% $426,984 
1952 4.56% 5.55% $618,609  1990 5.25% 4.62% $505,824  1973 4.51% 3.84% $430,075 
2008 4.39% 5.62% $628,232  1994 4.62% 4.72% $516,434  1970 4.34% 3.85% $431,554 
1993 5.86% 5.66% $632,881  1986 5.23% 4.73% $517,350  1988 5.25% 3.93% $438,389 
1939 5.17% 5.67% $634,502  1989 5.51% 4.75% $519,874 1987 5.09% 3.94% $439,045
1970 5.60% 5.75% $645,936  1973 5.23% 4.89% $535,573 1944 3.74% 3.95% $440,032
2009 5.10% 6.00% $683,596  1991 5.37% 4.92% $539,047 1964 4.80% 3.96% $441,295
1945 4.57% 6.01% $684,518  1992 5.29% 4.92% $539,339 1965 4.60% 4.01% $445,846
1971 6.64% 6.01% $684,574  1969 4.61% 4.96% $543,759 1990 4.83% 4.04% $447,890
1969 5.28% 6.06% $692,003  1940 4.42% 5.09% $559,035 1943 4.12% 4.05% $449,511
2002 5.04% 6.07% $693,780  1970 5.23% 5.17% $568,721 1966 4.56% 4.11% $455,191
1972 6.68% 6.14% $704,386  1939 4.91% 5.21% $573,390 1945 3.53% 4.14% $457,192
1995 5.19% 6.16% $708,035  1960 6.65% 5.22% $574,641 1989 5.11% 4.19% $462,384
2011 5.27% 6.28% $727,048  1968 4.41% 5.26% $579,600 1971 5.44% 4.23% $466,395
2010 5.47% 6.32% $734,492  1993 5.62% 5.28% $582,119 1942 3.89% 4.25% $468,412
1957 6.34% 6.37% $742,834  1961 6.35% 5.28% $582,346 1972 5.42% 4.26% $468,583
1996 5.42% 6.42% $751,789  1996 4.74% 5.29% $584,204 1994 4.26% 4.26% $469,019
1966 6.23% 6.55% $773,529  1967 4.95% 5.30% $584,550 1986 4.99% 4.34% $476,654
1954 5.72% 6.60% $783,320  1972 6.17% 5.33% $589,285 1991 4.99% 4.42% $484,846
2003 5.20% 6.67% $796,102  1971 6.27% 5.43% $602,388 1992 4.92% 4.44% $487,127
1962 6.84% 6.71% $802,898  1995 4.79% 5.51% $612,978 1941 4.01% 4.68% $512,433
2005 4.97% 6.72% $804,070  1962 6.08% 5.56% $619,018  1993 5.23% 4.78% $523,423 
2004 5.11% 6.78% $815,998  1963 6.26% 5.58% $622,044  1996 4.44% 4.90% $536,616 
2007 5.11% 6.80% $819,574  1964 6.03% 5.74% $644,029  1995 4.47% 5.11% $561,067 
2001 5.22% 6.84% $827,735  1965 5.80% 5.74% $644,093  1939 4.84% 5.15% $566,676 
1968 5.41% 6.89% $836,569  1997 5.34% 5.74% $644,738  1940 4.47% 5.19% $571,237 
1967 5.94% 6.89% $837,414  1999 4.79% 5.75% $646,408  1999 4.44% 5.24% $577,202 
2006 5.41% 6.90% $838,700  1966 5.73% 5.77% $648,369  1997 5.03% 5.32% $587,928 
1956 5.72% 6.93% $845,998  1998 5.05% 6.11% $700,375  1998 4.72% 5.65% $632,122 
1963 7.15% 6.95% $850,087  2010 5.45% 6.27% $726,476  2000 4.83% 5.81% $654,682 
1960 7.78% 6.97% $852,631  2009 5.32% 6.34% $738,025  2001 4.52% 5.83% $656,852 
1955 5.52% 7.06% $870,379  2000 5.22% 6.39% $746,804  2009 5.08% 6.03% $687,306 
1964 6.91% 7.10% $878,681  2001 4.98% 6.50% $765,703  2006 4.83% 6.03% $687,776 
1997 6.21% 7.13% $884,937  2006 5.30% 6.69% $799,984 2003 4.75% 6.05% $690,170
1959 7.27% 7.16% $892,018  2003 5.20% 6.70% $801,748 2004 4.62% 6.09% $696,585
1958 7.12% 7.16% $892,696  2011 5.56% 6.74% $807,816 2007 4.65% 6.13% $704,102
1965 6.71% 7.16% $892,928  2007 5.09% 6.74% $808,456 2005 4.55% 6.14% $704,659
1961 7.66% 7.32% $926,863  2004 5.09% 6.77% $813,537 2010 5.34% 6.15% $706,288
2000 5.88% 7.40% $943,788  2005 5.04% 6.82% $823,491 2002 5.04% 6.21% $715,823
1998 5.99% 7.58% $986,192  2002 5.52% 6.90% $839,271 2011 5.54% 6.73% $806,449
1999 6.10% 7.84% $1,048,997  2008 5.43% 7.32% $926,552 2008 5.06% 6.83% $825,328
Spearman 
Rank 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
with TW 0.763 1.00  
 Spearman 
Rank 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
with TW 0.710 1.00
 Spearman 
Rank 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
with TW 0.685 1.00 
 
 
Number of  
IRR > Geometric return 
 
IRR < Geometric Return 27 
46 
38 
35 
45 
28 
Exhibit 4
n=73 rolling 40-year paths from 1900-2011 sorted in order of terminal wealth outcomes  
The Table below provides the terminal wealth balances sorted from smallest to largest. The geometric and internal rates of return for each 40-year path 
are also presented found by employing formulas [1] and [2]. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is presented at the bottom of the Table and is 
related to terminal wealth.  Under the Table, the number of paths with the IRR>geometric return along with the inverse are recorded. 
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Interestingly, the number of paths which have experienced an IRR less than the geometric 
mean return increases as we move from left to right in Exhibit 4 with 27, 38 and 45 respectively for 
the TRF(70/30), TDF70(30-10) and TDF70(20-20). It is clear that a bad order of returns has been 
experienced by the plan member when IRR < geometric return. The results show that a bad order of 
returns seems to occur more frequently as we move from the TRF to the TDFs. This result is perhaps 
contrary to the common expectation. TDFs, due to their design, reduce the exposure to growth 
assets and, in turn, the average time-weighted rate of return over time (assuming that growth assets 
earn a higher rate of return as they have historically shown by Dimson et al, 2002). These low rates 
of return are impacting the IRR as the returns experienced by the TDFs in the final years of 
investment have been significantly lower than the TRF. 
These results corroborate work of Basu and Drew (2009) who examine the portfolio size 
effect and its impact of terminal wealth outcomes. One of the key themes to come this paper is that 
the allocation of assets when the portfolio size grows very large (typically the years immediately 
prior to retirement) is a critical determinant of terminal wealth outcomes. Exhibit 4 confirm these 
findings by illustrating that the de-risking nature of TDFs (i.e. lower allocation to growth assets with 
declining investment horizon) can cap the upside potential of the portfolio. The findings complement 
previous findings of Basu and Drew (2009); Basu et al (2011); Arnott (2012); Doran, Drew and Walk, 
2012; Bianchi, Drew and Walk (2013); Estrada (2013) and Okunev (2013). 
The methodology of comparing geometric returns and IRRs also allows for comparison of 
individual paths. Comparing the largest outcomes for each asset allocation strategy, we notice the 
geometric returns are 6.10%, 5.43% and 5.06% from left to right. These do not represent the 
maximum geometric returns though as the maximums occur at the 63rd (1960), 45th (1960) and 72nd 
(2011) rows for the TRF(70/30), TDF70(30-10) and the TDF70(20-20) respectively. The geometric 
return seem to proffer limited insights into accurately predicting the terminal wealth outcomes 
when compared to the IRR. 
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Conversely, the same story is depicted when observing the minimum geometric returns for 
each path. From left to right we observe 4.55%, 3.84% and 3.69% which occur at the 11th (1948), 8th 
(1948) and 3rd (1954) rows for the respectively asset allocation strategies. The results show why 
geometric (time-weighted) return is an unrealistic measure in situations with multiple contributions. 
Observing the maximums and minimums provides insight to the extremes of terminal wealth 
outcomes. However, the most striking results come from observing paths against each other. Exhibit 
5 below illustrates a few interesting paths selected from Exhibit 4.6 
 
TRF(70/30) TDF70 (30-10) TDF70 (20-20) 
 
Year 
 
Geometric 
 
IRR 
Terminal 
Wealth Year Geometric IRR 
Terminal 
Wealth Year Geometric IRR 
Terminal 
Wealth 
1972 6.68% 6.14% $704,386 1982 4.49% 2.83% $352,910 1957 4.22% 3.07% $369,702 
2006 5.41% 6.90% $838,700 1968 4.41% 5.26% $579,600 1941 4.01% 4.68% $512,433
 
Difference 
 
1.27% 
 
-0.76% 
 
-$134,314 Difference 0.08% -2.43% -$226,690 Difference 0.21% -1.61% -$142,731 
 
The paths illustrated in Exhibit 5 are selected to highlight some of the issues related to time-
weighted returns. Turning first to the TRF(70/30) we notice that the difference between the time-
weighted geometric returns is 127 basis points. Yet the terminal wealth outcome for the higher 
geometric return path is $134,314 less than that of the lower return path. 
Moving on to the TDFs, the story is much the same. For the TDF70(30-10), the paths that 
have a mere 8 basis points difference in a geometric return produce a $226,690 difference in 
terminal wealth. For the TDF70(20-20) path, a 21 basis points difference in geometric return result in 
a $142,731 difference; in terminal wealth. Moreover, in both cases, the larger geometric return 
produced the smaller terminal wealth outcome. These findings suggest that, when considering 
outcomes from retirement products, dollar-weighted returns are more appropriate to evaluate 
investment strategies (Dichev, 2007; Dichev and Yu, 2011).  
                                                            
6 The selection of these specific paths is simply to spark the discussion and is by no means a complete picture; 
the authors implore the reader to observe Exhibit 4 and derive further comparisons, there are too many to 
discuss within this paper. 
Exhibit 5 
Extract from Exhibit 4 highlighting some “interesting” paths between the asset allocation strategies 
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Concluding Comments 
TDFs are easy to implement and play an important role in the current retirement savings 
architecture. Our analysis confirms that TDFs are an ‘easy-bake’ product built around the target 
date, which is easy to understand. Using a plan member’s age and expected retirement date, the 
product implements an age-deterministic asset allocation strategy that aims to reduce the potential 
of having an adverse outcome in the final few years of the investor’s working life.  
However, as ours and other studies have shown, there are trade-offs, particularly related to 
forgoing significant upside potential. Evolution in fund design is necessary to achieve improved 
outcomes for the plan member. One way of achieving this may be through dynamic strategies 
informed on factors beyond a targeted retirement date. Recent work by Basu and Drew (2009); Basu 
et al (2011); Arnott (2012); Estrada (2013) and Okunev (2013) challenge the deterministic approach 
of traditional TDFs and the limitations of deterministic asset allocation strategies. We conclude by 
returning to Einstein’s famous epithet, that, in the murky world of retirement product design, 
“everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.  
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Replicating the methodology of Byrne et al (2006) we assume an age-real earnings profile 
our baseline.  The additional real growth rate is set at 2 per cent per annum (see Byrne et al, 2006).  
Figure A1 incorporates both the 2 per cent per annum and the increase due to the differences in an 
employee’s ability to achieve a higher salary increase in the earlier-to-mid career life as opposed to 
mid-to-end of their career.  
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Appendix One
